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Also I myself will die—like I was once born, developed into adulthood and got old. But the
question is, what this means.
This statement could well be from Simone de Beauvoir’s late work, The Coming of
Age, but it could equally well belong to Sartre’s or Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on
the temporality of the human condition. It comes, however, from a more distant
source which is less familiar to contemporary feminist theorists and philoso-
phers of life: the quote is from Husserl’s reflections on the finiteness of
human existence.¹ The cited paragraph illustrates well Husserl’s mature insight
that death and birth, together with historicity, unconsciousness, and sexual dif-
ference, belong among the transcendental problems to be studied by genetic
phenomenology (Husserl 1970, 187–88).² The philosophical task is not to explain
these phenomena but to explicate their meanings and their roles in the consti-
tution of intersubjectivity and objectivity (Husserl 1970, 187–88).³
This chapter discusses Simone de Beauvoir’s approach to old age within the
methodological framework of classical Husserlian phenomenology. My aim is
not to offer a historical reconstruction of Beauvoir’s The Coming of Age nor a
comprehensive reading or a detailed interpretation of her text. Rather, I will
focus on three insights that I find philosophically most important and tenable
in Beauvoir’s work, and I will develop these insights into a systematic account
of the phenomenon of aging. I will argue that aging is fundamentally a personal
transformation, a change in one’s relation to oneself, to others and to the world
which is not accountable by mere biological or social factors. My critical-con-
 Husserl 1992, 332; cf. Husserl 1989, 89.
 Genetic phenomenology studies the temporal order of meaning constitution. It does not
confine itself to the investigation of particular histories but, by the methods of eidetic variation,
aims at illuminating the essential steps and phases in all temporal institution or establishment
of meaning and sense. The mature Husserl argues that static analyses are a necessary part of
phenomenology but not sufficient in themselves because phenomenology aims at accounting for
the structures of meaning as well as for their geneses and origins (Husserl 1960, 66–81; 1968,
208– 17; 1978, 316–20). For an introduction to genetic phenomenology, see Steinbock 1995; cf.
Bachelard 1968; Sokolowski 1964.
 For an account of birth and death as transcendental problems, see Steinbock 1995, 134–37; cf.
Steinbock 2001, xxxii–xxxiv; Heinämaa 2010a and 2010b. For an account of sexual difference as
a transcendental problem, see Heinämaa 2003, 21–23, and Heinämaa 2004.
structive approach to The Coming of Age aims at making a new contribution to
the philosophy of aging but at the same time it is intended to demonstrate
that we—as today’s theorists of the human condition—have much to learn
from Beauvoir’s fearless approach and her clear insight.
In my understanding, The Coming of Age is a methodological twin sister of
The Second Sex. In a very similar fashion as in her first extensive study of the
human condition,⁴ Beauvoir offers a double illumination of her subject matter.
She tackles the problem of the old age—as she tackled the problem of sexual dif-
ference—in two different ways, first empirically and then philosophically. The
first part of The Coming of Age discusses experiential findings, from the fields
of natural and human-social sciences, biosciences, sociology, anthropology, eth-
nology, and history. The second part takes another approach and proposes a dif-
ferent task for reflection. Beauvoir starts from lived experiences and treats them
as particular examples of experiencing. She does not proceed by inductive infer-
ences or by empirical generalizations. Instead, she sees as her task to capture the
necessary structural features of the experience of aging, “the constants” of
“human reality,” as she herself calls them.
This approach to lived and intentional experiences can best be characterized
by classical phenomenological concepts: the philosopher begins from singular
experiences and aims at capturing the first person givenness of experiencing;
his⁵ task is not to dwell on particulars or to generalize over them but to proceed
to study the necessary structural features of all experience. The two reductions—
the transcendental-phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction—are
needed to liberate the investigation from all natural and habitual presupposi-
tions concerning the experienced object and the experiencing subject. By purify-
ing his consciousnesses from theoretical and practical positionings and from tra-
ditional preconceptions, and by imaginatively varying the experience thus
purified, the philosopher is able to bring into focus the constants of conscious
life. He is not just interested in the structures of his own personal life, or of
the lives of his contemporaries, but aims at finding the constants of all human
 Beauvoir uses the term “la réalité humaine” (“human reality,” in English). This is usually
understood as a translation of Heidegger’s “Dasein” but it covers what Husserl calls the meaning
or the sense of human existence (e.g., Husserl 1993).
 I use the male pronouns “he” and “his” in the neutral sense which refers to a human being. I
have chosen to do this, because my quotes are from the English translations of Beauvoir’s works
which follow this problematic convention (the corresponding problem strains, of course, the
original French text). In my own language (Finnish), personal pronouns lack gender marking so
that this problem does not occur.
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life—intimate and familiar life but also historically distant and culturally alien.
In this enterprise, his best alliances are the historian, the novelist and the poet.⁶
We find this aim clearly explicated by Beauvoir at the beginning of the sec-
ond part of The Coming of Age.⁷ Beauvoir does not rest satisfied with reporting
the plurality and richness of human experiences but proceeds to describe and
analyze the universal features that transcend cultural and historical peculiari-
ties. She writes:
[w]e can try to isolate the constants and to find the reasons for the differences. … To be sure,
the state of the aged has not been the same in all places and at all times; but rising through
this diversity there are constants that make it possible for me to compare various pieces of
evidence independently of date. (279, italics in the original)⁸
To be sure, the investigation of the constants of human life is not Beauvoir’s pri-
mary interest. Rather, her main goal is to put forward an ethical and political ar-
gument concerning the dignity and respectful treatment of human beings. How-
ever, her ethical and political claims rest on her existential-phenomenological
insight into the universal structures of human life, and the critical development
of this insight is goal of my essay.
Beauvoir’s existential-phenomenological claim about aging is that it con-
cerns three fundamental ontological structures of human life: its temporality,
its objectification in interpersonal relations and its necessarily bodily dimen-
sion.⁹ On the basis of her remarks, I will develop three arguments about the phe-
nomenon of aging: first, the claim that aging presents itself to us originally as a
personal metamorphosis; second, the idea that this metamorphosis involves a
radical change in the habitual self-objectification of the person; and third, the
thesis that aging affects not just our futural horizon but equally all temporal reg-
isters and ultimately the whole structure of lived time.
 Cf. Beauvoir 2004a; Husserl 1983, § 70, 145–48; Merleau-Ponty 1964.
 The methodological clarification is located in a similar way in The Coming of Age as in The
Second Sex.
 Cf. Beauvoir 1996, 361; 1989, xxxvi.
 In the beginning of the second part of The Coming of Age, Beauvoir lists the following
components of the experience of aging: body, image, time, history, praxis, others and the world,
and argues that these are co-implicatory and cannot be studied in isolation (1996, 279).
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The Event of Aging
The first crucial insight that we find in Beauvoir’s treatment of old age concerns
the ontic sense of aging: The phenomenon of getting old does not consists of any
progressive deterioration or slow alteration but of a sudden event or series of
such events. More precisely, aging is experientially not a gradual process but
is an unexpected happening that takes us by surprise.
Beauvoir uses several different terms to emphasize the event-character of
aging; she talks about “a surprise” (292), “a revelation” (290), “a metamorpho-
sis” (283), “a transformation” (290) and “a crisis” (379), and writes: “The fact
that the passage of universal time should have brought about a private, personal
metamorphosis is something that takes us completely aback” (283). And in an-
other section:
We must assume a reality that is certainly ourselves although it reaches us from the outside
and although we cannot grasp it. There is an insoluble contradiction between the obvious
clarity of the inward feeling that guarantees our unchanging quality and the objective cer-
tainty of our transformation. All we can do is to waver from the one to the other, never man-
aging to hold them both firmly together. (290)
Thus, Beauvoir offers a very different account of aging than the one we know
from the empirical sciences of life and nature. The aging human body is not
equated with deteriorating animal organisms or compared to vegetable life.
The phenomenon of human age has its own meaning structures and it deter-
mines its own parameters of investigation that undermine all kinds of naturalis-
tic and biologistic reductions.¹⁰
Beauvoir’s philosophical approach differs also from that of the social scien-
ces in which the person is studied primarily as an individual in a collective of
individuals. Beauvoir accounts for aging in the first person perspective: she
asks primarily how the change presents itself, or is given, to the person who un-
dergoes it (279). Others are not excluded from this type of investigation, but they
take part in the constitution of sense only as co-constituters and thus depend on
the constitutive activity of the experiencing person. As co-constituters others
cannot determine us from outside but need our active participation and commu-
nicative co-operation.
 This methodological argument is best known by the powerful formulation that Heidegger
gave to it in Being and Time (1992), but the argument has deep roots in the phenomenological
and existential traditions. For these roots, see Heinämaa (2010a and 2010c).
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Before proceeding to study the two other insights into old age that we find in
Beauvoir’s discourse, it is necessary to spend some time critically investigating
the concepts with which she operates while describing aging as a metamorpho-
sis. It is important to notice that the concepts that Beauvoir uses to emphasize
the suddenness of aging are of two different kinds. On the one hand, she uses
the ontological concepts of metamorphosis and transformation but, on the
other hand, she also operates with epistemological concepts, such as discovery,
revelation, and realization. These two types of concepts have different implica-
tions.
The concepts of metamorphosis and transformation propose that aging is, or
involves, a change in one’s fundamental way of being, i.e., an ontological
change.¹¹ The epistemological concepts, on the other hand, give the impression
that it is merely the cognitive experience of coming to know one’s new state that
is sudden and that the transformation itself is or may be gradual and relatively
slow. So we must ask what Beauvoir’s position really is on this matter: Does she
argue that aging itself is sudden or does she just propose that our realization of
the phenomenon comes unexpectedly? Was my judgment hasty, when I claimed
that the first result of her reflection concerns the abruptness of aging?
In my understanding Beauvoir’s philosophical discourse does not choose be-
tween the traditional alternatives of knowing and being or the epistemological
and the ontological. The fundamental tension or ambiguity that she thematizes
is not that between inner knowledge and external reality, or between inner sense
and outer substantiation. Rather, the tension is between two different forms of
self-relating, one proceeding by immediate experience and the other constituted
via relations with other subjects (Beauvoir 1976, 55). Both ways of relating to one-
self involve epistemological as well as ontological parameters. At the beginning
of The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir thematizes the duality of the human condi-
tion as follows:
“The continuous work of our life,” says Montaigne, “is to build death.” … Man knows and
thinks this tragic ambivalence which the animal and the plant merely undergo. A new para-
dox is thereby introduced into his destiny. “Rational animal,” “thinking reed,” he escapes
from his natural condition without, however, freeing himself from it. He is still a part of this
world of which he is a consciousness. He asserts himself as a pure internality against which
no external power can take hold, and he also experiences himself as a thing crushed by the
dark weight of other things. (7, emphases added)
 On the historical-philosophical problems involved in the concepts of metamorphosis, see
Songe-Møller 2008.
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The crisis of aging accentuates this necessary ambiguity of our existence, the
transcendental fact that we are constantly given to ourselves both directly as a
unique viewpoint to the whole world and via others as a worldly thing among
other worldly things. At the same time the phenomenon exacerbates the cogni-
tive tension between inner certainty and objective knowledge. Both tensions—the
ontological and the epistemological—constantly characterize our condition, but
the metamorphoses of maturation and aging bring them to the fore (Beauvoir
1996, 292–96). Thus understood, aging is a transition from one existential situa-
tion to another both of which involve an ontological as well as an epistemolog-
ical duality: we are given to ourselves and we know ourselves directly; but due to
our relations to others we are and we understand ourselves also through inter-
subjective mediation. This complex structure is brought to change in the event
of aging. Thus we have to ask: What part of us, or who, exactly is changed in
this metamorphosis? Beauvoir’s The Coming of Age gives us an important clue
also about the subject of the transformation.
Embodiment and its Two Aspects: Alienness and
Normativity
The second important insight that we find in Beauvoir’s discourse concerns the
particular aspect of our selfhood that undergoes the metamorphosis of aging.
Beauvoir argues that it is not the whole of me that changes in the event of
aging but only one part of me, i.e. one moment or sense of selfhood. In her
own words, it is “the other in me” who suddenly turns old (1996, 288/306 and
294/312, translation modified, emphasis added). She elaborates this insight fur-
ther by stating: “Within me it is the other—that is to say the one that I am for
others—who is old: and that other is myself [moi]” (284/302, translation modi-
fied, emphasis added). It is worth studying this paradoxical formulation in
some detail while keeping in mind the existential question: Who is it exactly
that turns old in this metamorphosis?
The first part of Beauvoir’s formulation gives a simple answer to the question
above: the aspect that turns old in me is the one that is given to others and exists
primarily for them. This answer invites the notion that the aged person is like a
mask or a role that we have to accept or assume because of our social depend-
ences. Some sections of Beauvoir’s reflection support this line of interpretation.
Her quotes from Marcel Proust and André Gide, for example, introduce the met-
aphors of masks, costumes, disguises, roles and play-acting (cf. 1996, 289 and
296), and the Sartrean concepts of image and the unrealizable that she uses
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also suggest the idea of an imposed change (291–93).¹² The quote from Proust’s
Time Regained (Le temps retrouvé), in particular, is efficient in transmitting the
alienating aspect of aging while picturing the aged person as if in a constant
masquerade, wandering among acquaintances and friends whom she cannot
recognize and who cannot recognize him:
“At first I could not understand why I found some difficulty in recognizing the master of the
house and the guests, and why everyone there was ‘made up’—a make-up that usually in-
cluded powder and that altered them entirely. The prince … had provided himself with a
white beard and as it were with leaden soles which dragged at his feet, so that he seemed
to be playing the part of one of the Ages of Life.” (Quoted in Beauvoir 1996, 289/307)
However, the second part of Beauvoir’s formulation challenges the metaphors of
masks, roles and play-acting by identifying the aging other with the subject it-
self. “Within me it is the other … who is old,” Beauvoir writes, but adds: “and
that other is myself.”
I want to argue that this paradox must be understood in the frame of Beau-
voir’s existential-phenomenological account of embodiment. The crucial idea
here is that our own bodies are always given to us in a double way: originally
and immediately as systems of sensibility and motility, and secondarily and me-
diately—via our relations with others—as perceptual and movable objects. These
are not two separate realities but are two sides or dimensions of one complex
phenomenon. This means that, when we speak about the “mask” of old age
(296), we must keep in mind that this “mask” is not separate from our own
flesh. Rather, it is the “outer side” of our own sensibility and motility, inter-
twined with the sensations, movements and affections that give us our own bod-
ily processes as well as the external events. This “mask” can never be thrown off,
never separated from our sensuous-motor and affective experiences.When we fi-
nally drop it, we must also let go of life.
The theatrical metaphors of mask, role and play-acting are illuminative in
thematizing an internal fission within the aged subject, between his cogito (“I
suffer,” “I cry”) and his external appearance (“he suffers,” “he cries”).¹³ But
 Compare this argument to Beauvoir’s and Sartre’s interchange in Adieux where she ends up
claiming that the experience of temporality that Sartre claims to have is “completely abnormal”
(Beauvoir 1984, 418).
 In The Coming of Age, Beauvoir distinguishes between two senses and two constitutive
moments of selfhood, the self as the agent of cogito and the self (moi) as a transcendent object
(“psychological pseudo-realities”) (Beauvoir 1996, 291 and 398; cf. 1984, 420–21). I have argued
elsewhere that, despite her loyalty to Sartre, she never accepted his early argument in his The
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these metaphorical tools become misleading if we conclude or imply that being
aged is a performance, a social or cultural convention or an artificial production.
Being old does not mean that we have agreed to play the role of the aged person
or have taken this role on us in order to adjust to the reactions, requirements and
expectations of others.We do not act old.Why would we? We submit to old age
and become old (cf. Beauvoir 1996, 375 and 540).
Beauvoir accounts for this paradoxical condition in Sartrean terms: she ex-
plains that we do not experience our age “in the for-itself mode” but encounter it
in our being-for-others.¹⁴ According to her, the disparity comes from the funda-
mental fact that we learn to differentiate between youth and old age in the faces
and bodies of others, and only later come to realize that this distinction also ap-
plies to our objectified selves.We do not immediately connect the quality of age
to ourselves but by mediation, via our perceptions of others and the other’s per-
ceptions of us. Moreover, Beauvoir suggests that we can never relate this quality
to our absolute being-for-ourselves (291). She states: “Old age is particularly dif-
ficult to assume because we have always regarded it as something alien, a for-
eign species: ‘Can I have become a different being while I still remain myself?’”
(283)
The disparity that Beauvoir thematizes can be described more precisely in
phenomenological terms in the following manner. The condition of “being
old” concerns myself in so far as I am objectified as a perceivable and socially
significant body, i.e., given to myself as part of the perceivable and instrumental
world that is equally accessible to all agents. This objectified self is not the only
aspect of my corporeality. In addition to it, and prior to it, I am given to myself as
a touching-touched and moving-moved power. My primary corporeal self is nei-
ther a perceivable thing, given equally to all perceivers, nor an invaluable object
of the communal world; rather my primary corporeal self is my lived body as it is
constituted to me in tactile and kinesthetic sensations, in self-touching and in
spontaneous movement.¹⁵ The disparity is thus between my body as an intersub-
Transcendence of the Ego that the ego is nothing but a transcendent object (Heinämaa 2003, 57–
61); cf. Björk 2008.
 Also other types of conditions accentuate the tensions between being-for-oneself and being-
for-others, e.g., mental and physical sickness and injury, exceptional ugliness and beauty and
different types of deformation. Cf. Jenny Slatman’s phenomenological interpretation of body-
implants (Slatman 2009; Slatman and Widdershoven 2010), and Gail Weiss’ discourse on Sia-
mese twins (2008).
 Cf. Sartre 1998, 404–45; Merleau-Ponty 1995, 90–97; Husserl 1993, 86 and 152–58; Husserl
1970, 213–15.
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jectively given entity in the world and my body as the center of all my worldly
attachments.
My situation in the perceivable world and in my personal environment
changes constantly, throughout my whole life: I am now here in Helsinki work-
ing in my office and yesterday I was in Lisbon swimming in the Atlantic. I was
sick and now I am well. I have been tired and exhausted but now I am happy
and energetic. All these qualities are given in different ways both to myself
and to others, and due to my relations with others I also gain an external per-
spective on my states and qualities.
Occasionally, my immediate self-givenness and my appearance in the inter-
subjective world may conflict. I may look tired but feel energetic; I may appear
sad while just being attentive. Such partial conflicts do not usually mark any
global, all-encompassing divergence between self-givenness and intersubjective
appearance. Some events, however, inflict a comprehensive change or a crisis of
existence. The fundamental equilibrium, established in childhood and youth be-
tween self-givenness and objective appearance, is then shaken (283–86). The
bodily self that we grasp immediately and “internally” by sensations, move-
ments and affects does not anymore correspond to the bodily self that we
know “externally,” by the mediation of others. In this sense my existential situa-
tion has changed.
Beauvoir argues that the disparity that marks the event of becoming old is
usually inflicted by the reactions of others. She claims that the revelation of
aging comes often from outside and is always connected to my existence for oth-
ers. “The aged person comes to feel that he is old by means of others, and with-
out having experienced important changes; his inner being does not accept the
label that has been stuck to him—he no longer knows who he is.” (292)
So according to Beauvoir, age concerns myself primarily insofar as I am for
others. However, this objectified sense of self is not foreign to me or imposed on
me, but is part of myself insofar as I live in relations with others and insofar as
they take part in the constitution of the perceivable world with me (cf. Beauvoir
1984, 420–21).¹⁶ In other words, my external appearance does not remain outer
or alien to me—it cannot—as it always already is included in my being in the
world.
Beauvoir emphasizes that no actual others, no scornful looks or pitiful talks,
are needed to trigger the metamorphosis of aging. Our body—as it is given to us
in our personal dealings with the world—always implies the look of the other. At
the age of sixty, she writes, “Lou Andreas Salomé lost her hair after an illness: up
 Cf. Beauvoir 1976, 55, 61, 71 and 91.
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until then she had felt ‘ageless’” (1996, 287). To enter the metamorphosis of
aging, it is enough that we experience a disparity between the two aspects of
our bodies: our bodies as our familiar practical and expressive means of access-
ing the world, on the one hand, and our bodies as publicly observable objects of
the world, on the other hand.
The very same duality manifests itself abruptly already in the transforma-
tions of childhood and adolescence, but in old age it receives a specific function,
that of announcing our death. The material objects that now fall off from our
bodies, or appear on or in them, do not signal a rebirth, as they did in childhood
and youth, but function as emblems of an ending: falling hair, cracking teeth,
shaking spotted hands, dropped eyelids, thick yellow nails—shadows of our
skull.
It is worth studying more closely the givenness of these peculiar “things”
which oddly belongs to our bodies but at the same time are alien to us,¹⁷ for
they disclose something crucial about the metamorphosis of aging. My point
is not that aging is restricted to such phenomena. In addition to them, it also in-
volves drastic changes in our bodily powers and motor capacities. However, I be-
lieve that an important general feature about aging is more easily explicated by
studying such ambivalent “body parts” than by focusing on the weakening of
skills and capacities. This feature is the uncanny character of old age, its abnor-
mal normality or “normal abnormality,” as Beauvoir puts it. Distancing from
Beauvoir’s account, however, I want to argue that old age is not just given to
us by the reactions of others and does not just concern our bodies-for-others
but also involves changes in the habitual norms of lived bodiliness. So let us
study how our most material body parts disclose themselves to us in the process
of aging.
When teeth, hairs and nails are separated from our sensing, living bodies,
they function as full-fledged material objects accessible to all perceivers equally.
They fall to the floor in the very same manner as any worldly objects, and their
destruction does not cause any sensations of physical pain or distress in our bod-
ies. Moreover, these objects can be observed, manipulated and studied from dif-
ferent viewpoints—both by ourselves and by others. Usually, they are handled as
 Julia Kristeva’s term “abject” captures nicely the ambivalent character of such “body parts”:
“A massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have been in an
opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that.
But not nothing, either. A ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of meanin-
glessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of
non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me” (1984, 2).
176 Sara Heinämaa
waste, but sometimes they are preserved as memories; and in the developmental
processes of childhood they have great symbolic value.¹⁸
On the other hand, as long as our teeth, hair and nails remain functioning
parts of our sensing living bodies, they do not appear to us as full-fledged objects
but serve as locations and means of sensation and as practical tools. Our teeth,
for example, are less sensitive to touch and warmth than our skin but they still
have proprioception as well as sensations of pain; and even if we do not have
any feeling in our hair, it is constantly given on the scalp by its weight, warmth,
position, and movement. In respect to sensibility, the function of these bodily el-
ements is more integral to personhood than the function of incorporated devices,
such as clothes and tools. When we lose them, we have to adapt to a change in
the system of sensibility.
To be sure, such changes are alien and external to our freely willing self. My
hair, for example, may block my vision, and my aching teeth may prevent me
from focusing on reading and thinking. Thus our bodies and our body parts
may appear as obstacles or hindrances to our freely chosen projects. Such expe-
riences form an integral part of the phenomena of sickness and aging. In a sim-
ilar way as an infected eye may prevent me from seeing things at a distance or at
the margins of my normal visual environment, a dropped eyelid may also limit
my familiar visual field. Weakness in legs may prevent me from running and
dancing, and trembling hands cannot cut or hit as steady hands can.
In all these cases, my body appears as alien or contrary to my willing self,
but it is crucial to notice that this willing self is not completely independent
or separated from all sensibility. Two factors in particular must be emphasized
here: First, my present lived body and its parts may appear as hindrances but
this is possible merely because my willing self is habituated to a different
body, a sensing and moving self with larger powers and broader environments.
My eyelids are given to me now as dropped because they used to be light; my
legs appear as stiff and weak because they were able to perform far-reaching
movements. So my present embodiment appears as faulty against the back-
ground of my previous mode of embodiment and not against a general form
characteristic of humans or against a disembodied, purely spiritual will. Second,
 In all these cases, our body parts function as cultural objects with cultural values and
meanings, and thus they can be compared to utensils and ritualistic objects. It is important to
notice, however, that our body parts can also serve as nutrition for animals. This means that
there are perceiving subjects in our environment that treat or can treat our bodies and organs as
material for their own natural organic functions. Moreover, the experience of breast feeding
demonstrates that this type of objectification is not restricted to our relations with animals:
human beings also consume the bodily fluids of other human beings.
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our weakening sense-organs and limbs are for us the necessary, although disap-
pointing, means of accessing the practical and affective surrounding and mon-
itoring the perceivable field. These sparse teeth are now our only means of mas-
ticating food; these eyes with falling eyelids are the ones that we have for seeing;
these stiff crooked fingers and these trembling hands are our means of pointing,
grasping and caressing, and the heavy legs are the ones that move us around in
space.
The bodily means now available divert from the norms of our habitual per-
ception and movement and from their optima.¹⁹ Together they produce an “ab-
normal condition” (285), not in relation to any external standard—that of perceiv-
able things, physical bodies or other similar selves—but in relation to the
standards that we have established for ourselves in our perceptual-motor
life.²⁰ At the same time, however, they institute another norm and another opti-
mum. Thus old age can rightly be called a “normal abnormality” (286).
This analysis suggests that our mirror image is only secondarily infected by
age. We cannot realize that we are old simply by staring at the mirror or at the
faces of others; we must already feel, or suspect, that we have changed before
we can detect and identify with our new appearance in the reflection. Here
my analysis diverts from the main line of Beauvoir’s discussion.²¹ This means
that aging is a complex phenomenon, and not simply captured by the distinction
between being-for-itself and being-for-others.We appear as old in several differ-
ent but related and dependent, ways: by certain objectivities that belong to the
shared world, by departures from intersubjective optima, by deviations from our
own habitual norms and by the establishment of new norms.
In The Coming of Age, Beauvoir’s argues that the crisis of aging can be han-
dled in several different ways, some more successful than others.²² She points
 On the phenomenology of norms and normality, see Heinämaa 2012b.
 In The Normal and the Pathological, Georges Canguilhem emphasizes that the constitution of
new profound norms is typical to childhood. This means that the condition of the child can be
compared to the condition of the sick, or the old, but should not be identified with either one of
them. Such an identification is “an absurdity because it ignores that eagerness which pushes the
child to raise itself constantly to new norms, which is profoundly at variance with the care to
conserve which directs the sick person in his obsessive and often exhausting maintenance of the
only norms of life within which he feels almost normal” (Canguilhem 1991, 189).
 Interestingly, Beauvoir includes also this idea in her account but does not work out its
implications. She writes: “we must already have some cause for uneasiness before we stand and
study the reflection offered us by the looking-glass” (1996, 287).
 The argument is very similar to the one that we find in The Second Sex where Beauvoir shows
that the feminine condition can be lived in several different ways, some more “happy” than
others: the narcissist, the woman in love, the mystic and the independent woman (1989, 629–
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out that we may live in different forms of self-deception clinging to our former
habits and coining essences (362). Alternatively we can affirm the transformation
and do the best possible with the means and capacities now available. We can
also remain vacillating between our two modes of givenness—being for ourselves
and being for others (291), or else we can try to find a new equilibrium between
these two appearances and establish new norms for our self-relation and for our
relations with others (cf. 540–43). In any case, a comprehensive change requires
that we renew our engagement to our goals and values and to those of others.
Beauvoir expresses this insight in The Coming of Age with the same resoluteness
as in The Ethics of Ambiguity:
There is only one solution if old age is not to be a derisory parody of our former existence,
and that is to go on pursuing ends that give our life a meaning—devotion to individuals, to
collectives, to causes, social, political, intellectual or creative work. … One’s life has value
so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of love, friendship, indigna-
tion, compassion. (540–41/567; translation modified; cf. Beauvoir 1976, 67; Heinämaa
2012a)
We have seen that the transformation of aging includes several phenomena: op-
erative organs loose their liveliness and get overloaded by their materiality; our
actions and performances come constantly short by common standards but also
by our own standards of normality; others react to us in unexpected ways, and
we ourselves find it hard to recognize our reflection in mirror. We certainly get
old in the eyes of others, as Beauvoir argues, but at the same time, we also
get old by a fundamental transformation of our own lived bodies.
In addition to these bodily changes, external and internal, aging also in-
volves a change in our temporal horizons of experiencing. Contrary to the com-
mon sense conception according to which aging means that our past grows and
our future shrinks, I will develop in the following the Beauvoirian insight that
aging affects both horizons equally and that it means, at worst, a collapse of
the horizontal structure of lived time in whole.
715; cf. Heinämaa 2012a). These “justificatory types” should be compared with those that Be-
auvoir distinguishes in The Ethics of Ambiguity: the infantile, the serious, the nihilist, the ad-
venturer, the passionate altruist and the artistic critic (ch. “Personal Freedom and Others,” 1976,
35–73). I have clarified the Kierkegaardian background of this methodology of types in my
Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference (2003); cf. Björk 2008.
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Temporality, Death, and Future
Beauvoir’s third insight concerns the temporality of old age. She argues that the
metamorphosis of aging brings with a radical change in the temporal form of ex-
periencing, that is, a change in the tripartite structure of past, present and future.
She claims that both the lived future and the lived past undergo a fundamental
change in this transformation: the future which has gaped open is suddenly
closed, and the past which has felt light and vivid weights now heavy. The
aged find themselves trapped between two monoliths: “A limited future and a
frozen past” (378).²³
Following Sartre, Beauvoir claims that the critical change in the metamor-
phosis of aging is the closure of the futural horizon. For the infant, the future
is without limits (375–76). For the young person, the future is an infinite field
for possible activities and happenings. The mature and the middle aged see
the years in an indefinite series, coming one after another. The aged person, in
contrast, is the one who is able to imagine an endpoint, and more: he is the
one who sees an ending and must live in its proximity. The future has lost its
stretch; life is finite; and each year, each day and each moment is framed by
the idea of a final halt—impossible but inevitable²⁴:
[t]he very quality of the future changes between middle age and the end of one’s life. At
sixty-five one is not merely twenty years older than one was at forty-five. One has ex-
changed an indefinite future—that one tends to regard as infinite—for a finite future. In ear-
lier days we could see no boundary-mark upon the horizon: now we do see one. (378/400,
translation modified)
The closure of the future is immediately reflected in the lessened dynamism of
the past. As our futural projects shrink and shorten, as their time-span diminish-
es, they cannot support our contact with the past anymore. In order to posses our
past, Beauvoir argues, we must bind it to existence by futural projects (361).
When death comes to limit our time span, the narrative structure of our life
breaks down and our memories flout free without temporal anchors. Finally, in-
stead of being remembered, the past is relived and repeated in empty gestures.
Beauvoir compares the final past to a wreck and describes its foundering as fol-
lows:
 Cf. Beauvoir 1996, 416; Beauvoir 1984, 420.
 For the idea of death as an impossible possibility, see Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time
(1992); cf. Heinämaa 2010a.
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As I was moving forward, so it was crumbling. Most of the wreckage that can still be seen is
colourless, distorted, frozen: its meaning escapes me. Here and there, I see occasional
pieces whose melancholy beauty enchants me. They do not suffice to populate this empti-
ness … “the desert of the past.” (365)
Usually we describe old persons by saying that they have many years behind, a
long existence or even a whole history (361). Beauvoir rejects this commonplace
notion and argues that instead of accumulating, the past collapses in the last
phases of our life. Objective accounts can attach a long history to each present,
but this is possible only in the third-person perspective.²⁵ For the aged them-
selves, the past is given in a completely different way. Rather than extending
by length, it grows heavy, loses its flexibility and succumbs to an obscurity.
The metaphors of weight and heaviness describe the experience more accurately
than those of length: without the support of an open future, the living present
cannot sustain the weight of the enormous past. Thus the whole structure of
lived time trembles when the futural horizon is closing.
This Beauvoirian analysis of aging renders the aged person as an anomaly. It
must be emphasized, however, that the old age is not a paradox as such, but
presents itself in this way in the conceptual framework that defines human sub-
jectivity by freedom and transcendence.²⁶ The aged person has come to the vicin-
ity of a limit, which cannot be overcome (Beauvoir 1984, 420).²⁷ Moreover, he
must live in the nearness of this limit, and find or create meaning despite her
inability to transcend death. Thus, his existence questions the idea of life as
pure transcendence.
Despite the negative tone of her descriptions, Beauvoir claims that meaning-
ful life is possible at the frontier of death. She argues, however, that this possi-
bility remains empty or merely conceptual unless we transform our individual
and communal lives completely:
Once we have understood what the state of the aged really is, we cannot satisfy ourselves
with calling for a more generous “old-age policy”, higher pensions, decent housing and or-
ganized leisure. It is the whole system that is at issue and our claim cannot be otherwise
than radical—change life itself. (1996, 543)
Beauvoir contends that in the nearness of death, our future horizon can open
onto new dimensions. Our activities and projects can refer, trans-generationally,
 Cf. Heinämaa 2010c, 81–85.
 Cf. Beauvoir 1976, 70 and 90–91.
 Cf. Beauvoir 1996, 371–72.
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to the lives of future others, successors and descendants, in several generations
(379).²⁸ However, according to Beauvoir, this possibility is merely conceptual for
most of us. We may imagine such openings, and we can find them described in
historical, anthropological and ethnographic sources, but when we look around
in the present, we notice that such prospects are given merely to few exceptional
or privileged individuals. The trans-generational futurity is not an essential pos-
sibility of all humans as Sartre suggests nor a structural feature of human life as
Levinas argues in Time and the Other (1987) and Totality and Infinity (1994).
Beauvoir’s analysis suggests that it is merely a historical possibility, an option
for some but not all: “Generally speaking,” Beauvoir argues, implicitly challeng-
ing Levinas’ view, “the father does not see himself in his son. Nothingness swal-
lows him entirely” (1996, 380, translation modified).²⁹
The trans-generational opening of the future is a cultural and historical var-
iable for Beauvoir, and not a constant of human life. She points out that it has
been, and still is, possible for some people in some cultures, but she asserts that
in modern industrial and technological societies this type of futurity is an ines-
sential exception. Only certain specific and rare practices allow the development
of personal achievements and accomplishments which can operate as starting
points for new projects, not just for ourselves but also for others who follow
us in time.
Beauvoir argues that in modernity all production is subjected to consump-
tion and tends to become mechanical (1996, 380–82), and that only individuals
engaged in highly intellectual or spiritual activities are able to project a future
which transcends the prospects of immediate utility. She discusses five examples
of such professions: the scientist, the philosopher, the writer, the artist and the
politician (388–434). Only in these few professions, can personal time, already
barred by death and weighted down by the past, reopen and retain its reference
to the future of descendents and successors. The majority of old people live bar-
ren, deserted lives in isolation, repetition and boredom. Beauvoir’s disillusioned
view is almost devastating:
Past events, acquired knowledge retain their place, but in a life whose fire has faded: they
have been.When memory cracks, the events sink and vanish in a ridiculous darkness; life
unravels stitch by stitch like a frayed piece of knitting, leaving nothing but formless strands
of wool in the old person’s hands. (539–40/566, translation modified)
 Cf. Beauvoir 1976, 60. For Beauvoir’s philosophy of futurity, see Heinämaa 2010b.
 Cf. Levinas 1987, 91; 1994, 267; cf. Sartre 1985, 535–39. For Levinas’ discourse of trans-
generational relations, see Heinämaa 2010b.
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The insight that only privileged people can gain a future from younger genera-
tions is operative already in The Coming of Age. It is not fully explicated or de-
fended by arguments but it is clearly stated and well articulated in a few forceful
paragraphs. I have provided a systematic explication here and have developed
Beauvoir’s view further. I have done this, not only for exegetic reasons but
more importantly for systematic ones: I believe that Beauvoir offers us a fresh
insight which is more accurate than the analyses of Sartre and Levinas. Both Sar-
tre and Levinas argue trans-generational future is a structural feature of human
life, but Beauvoir challenges this notion and claims that this form of lived tem-
porality is not a constant but is a variable dependent on historical and social pa-
rameters.
In order to see this controversy more clearly, I will turn to a later text by
Beauvoir, in which the topic of aging and time comes forth with a new acuteness.
This is Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre (La céremonie des adieux, 1981) that Beauvoir
wrote after Sartre’s death on the basis of her notebooks from the 1970 s. In The
Coming of Age, the idea of trans-generational future is discussed in abstract
terms, but in Adieux the topic has a concrete setting and a personal emphasis:
Beauvoir argues against Sartre, who functions in the dialogue as the main
topic but also as a lifelong philosophical companion and interlocutor already
marked by death.
At the end of June Sartre began to suffer cruelly from his tongue. He could neither eat nor
speak without pain. I said to him, “Really, this is a horrible year; you have troubles all the
time.” “Oh, it doesn’t matter,” he replied. “When you’re old it no longer has any impor-
tance.” “How do you mean?” “You know it won’t last long.” “You mean because one’s
going to die?” “Yes. It’s natural to come to pieces, little by little. When you’re young, it’s
different.” The tone in which he said this overwhelmed me; he already seemed to be on
the far side of life. (Beauvoir 1984, 19)³⁰
I will end my discussion of the metamorphosis of aging by studying how the idea
of trans-generational future that Beauvoir introduced in The Coming of Age is de-
veloped by her in the farewell-dialogue with Sartre. By this extension, we can
further our understanding of the evolution of Beauvoir’s thought but more im-
portantly we gain a better understanding of the constants and the variables of
the phenomenon itself.
 Cf. Beauvoir 1984, 131 and 445.
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The Adieux
Adieux can rightly be called Beauvoir’s last philosophical dialogue with Sartre.
The book is composed of two parts. The first part is a notebook and a biography
of the last ten years of Sartre’s life, starting with the aggravating symptoms of
Sartre’s illness in 1970 and ending in Sartre’s death in 1980. The second part con-
sists of Beauvoir’s philosophical and personal conversations with Sartre, made
in August and September 1974. Sartre is already very sick and almost blind.
Beauvoir invites him to discuss a variety of different topics, philosophical, liter-
ary, political and personal. Old age is one of them.
The “conversations” function as a recording of Sartre’s final thoughts but
they also witness a dialogue between two thinkers. Beauvoir proposes a topic,
one after the other; she asks questions, presents her position, and thus invites
Sartre to present his own views. Sometimes the answer is short and definite,
and the two proceed together to the next topic. At other occasions, Beauvoir
presses Sartre and argues against him or refuses to abandon a problem that
she finds important. The themes of the conversations range from concrete to ab-
stract and they move between the personal to the universal: work, writing and
thinking; novelists and philosophers³¹; food, eating and sexuality; life, birth
and death; politics, freedom and equality; memory and recollection; childhood
and old age.
The two last conversations focus on the topic of human life. Beauvoir starts
by asking Sartre how he sees his “life as a whole” (1984, 425). Sartre answers by
outlining a basic structure of human life that opens in birth and closes in death,
but interestingly he also describes a final phase of old age in which life broadens
toward the intersubjective and the universal:
Generally, I see not only my life but all lives roughly in this way—a threadlike beginning
that slowly broadens with the acquisition of knowledge and the earliest experiences, ad-
ventures, and a whole range of feelings. Then from a certain age that varies according to
the person, partly because of himself, partly because of his body, and partly because of cir-
cumstances, life moves toward its close, death being the final closing as birth was the
opening. But as I see it this time of closure is accompanied by a continual broadening to-
ward the universal. A man of fifty or sixty who is traveling toward death, is at the same time
learning and also experiencing a certain number of relations with others and with society,
relations that grow wider and wider. (1984, 425–26)
 Sartre and Beauvoir discuss the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Camus, but
also Proust, Gide, Genet and Flaubert.
184 Sara Heinämaa
Here Sartre proposes that, in the nearness of death, a new intersubjectivity and
through it a new futurity is constituted for the aging person. The perspective of
the young and the mature adult are broadened and opened, and as a result the
time of the experiencing subject can refer in a new way to the lived times of other
diachronic subjects. Sartre’s reflection suggests that this is a structural feature, a
constant, of all human life: facing the impossible possibility of its own cessation,
the singular human life opens onto the universal and futural humanity. He con-
tinues:
A certain form moves forward its completion, and at the same time the individual acquires
knowledge or patterns of thought … that go in the direction of universality. He acts either in
favor of a certain society or for its preservation, or in favor of the creation of another society.
And this society will perhaps only appear after his death. In any event its development will
take place after his death. In the same way most of the undertakings [projects] that concern
him in the last part of his life will be successful if they are carried on after his death … but
will come to nothing if they end before it. (426)
In another section, Sartre describes a naïve notion that he had of his existence in
his early adult years. He believed that he could gain eternity by his literary and
philosophical creations. He describes this notion as a secularized version of the
Christian idea of immortality and explains that he rejected it already by his con-
cept of committed writing (152–53).³²
Motivated by the social and political turn in his thinking, Sartre now enter-
tains the idea that we can choose to participate in long-term communal projects
in which our successors continue and prolong our work for common goods or
universal ends. In Adieux, he makes clear that such sharing is possible only in
political and social activities, that is, in activities that are co-operative by defini-
tion. Whereas artistic creations remain tied to individual and personal interests,
political and social activities point beyond the limits of one’s personal life. Sartre
summarizes his mature view by claiming that “there is a future that lies beyond
death and that almost turns death into an accident in the individual’s life, a life
that goes on without him” (426). He seems to think that this is a general possi-
bility, an option open in principle to all humans, even if realized only by few.
Beauvoir intervenes here and points out that Sartre’s “general” description
applies merely to certain “privileged people” (426). She claims that in modernity,
 Cf. Beauvoir 1984, 413. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir attributes this attitude to the
personal type that she calls “the adventurer”. She writes: “When he dies, the adventurer will be
surrendering his whole life into the hands of men; the only meaning it will have will be the one
they confer upon it. He knows this since he talks about himself, often in books” (Beauvoir 1976,
63).
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trans-generational future is possible but merely for intellectuals and artists such
as Sartre and herself. For most people, all productive and creative activities with
long futural perspectives and intersubjective bearing end with retirement, and
the world as a whole is replaced by a shrinking personal environment. Old
age, she states, rarely has the enlarging or broadening form that Sartre describes
(426).
In the light of these paragraphs, it seems to me that Beauvoir’s understand-
ing of the futurity of human life differs from the accounts offered by her contem-
poraries.Whereas Sartre and Levinas describe the trans-generational opening as
a structural feature of human existence, Beauvoir argues that this type of tempo-
rality is not given with humanity but achieved in certain specific modes of co-ex-
istence. It is not a constant of the human condition but a variable.
Beauvoir’s view is informed by her historical comparisons but also by her
sensitivity to personal, social and cultural differences. In Adieux it is accentuated
by the contrast to Sartre’s conception. The methodological lesson that we can
learn from this interchange is that historical, cultural and interpersonal compar-
isons assist critical philosophical reflections by challenging our preconceptions
of human nature. The work on free variation that aims at identifying the struc-
tural features of experience is not any armchair activity but is a demanding ex-
ercise that requires that we question our conceptions repeatedly. Exchange with
empirical science and with history and the arts is indispensable since it strength-
ens our imagination and cures us of the overestimation of our own capacities of
fantasizing.
Conclusions
I have argue$$, on the basis of Beauvoir’s remarks, that experientially aging in-
volves three characteristic factors that concern our whole existence and affect
our conscious life in a comprehensive way. This implies that aging has a philo-
sophical significance and that it cannot, as a phenomenon, be adequately han-
dled by empirical life-sciences or social sciences. The three existential facts
about aging explicated in this essay are the following: First, aging as a phenom-
enon is not a slow gradual alteration but is a sudden and thorough transforma-
tion. Second, aging affects our bodily self in its two central dimensions: we
change both in our bodily being-for-others and in our being-for-ourselves. And
finally aging does not just diminish our future expectations but also problemat-
izes our relation to our own past. Thus understood, aging is a fundamental and
all-inclusive personal metamorphosis and is not a contingent change in our
outer appearance or social role. Further, the analysis implies that human life
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is not a continuous process of generation, blooming and decay, comparable to
the life of a plant, but includes a series of radical transformations in which
the self is lost and regained.³³
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